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Abstract
This article discusses the potential benefits of
an enhanced use of externality pricing
schemes in the Asia Pacific. Prices on emis-
sions and congestion could ameliorate the
negative effects of underpriced resource use,
be pro-poor and improve fiscal capacities. The
main implementation challenges are political
and institutional. Lessons are drawn from
recent experiences in environmental taxation
and the removal of fossil fuel subsidies.
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1. Introduction
Many countries in the Asia Pacific are facing a
trifecta of challenges: the needs to (i) reduce
pollution, traffic congestion and other negative
externalities; (ii) continue to improve living
standards, particularly for the poor; and (iii)
strengthen the state of public finances. There is
one reform program capable of making a con-
tribution to tackling all three challenges. This
program is known as environmental, external-
ity or ‘green’ pricing.
Economic theory indicates that market
economies work well when prices reflect the
marginal costs of resource use. In practice,
however, there are a variety of reasons why
prices diverge from marginal-cost levels.
Economists have long (Marshall 1890; Pigou
1920) recognised that among these is the exis-
tence of external effects (or externalities). If
my driving adds to pollution, traffic congestion
and crash risks, my private costs of driving will
be less than the social costs, and from society’s
point of view I will likely drive too much.
Orthodox economic theory suggests that I
should face appropriate prices for the negative
externalities that I cause.
A natural implication is that tax policy can
be used to achieve environmental and other
goals in addition to raising government
revenue, killing two (or perhaps even three)
birds with one stone. While the usefulness of
price-based approaches to managing externali-
ties is widely accepted among economists
(Mankiw 2009; Parry et al. 2012), in the Asia
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Pacific green pricing remains in its infancy.
Some countries instead maintain large subsi-
dies for fossil fuel use. These exacerbate rather
than reduce budgetary, pollution, congestion
and other problems.
This article discusses how green fiscal instru-
ments can address the trifecta of challenges. I
first review these challenges (Section 2) before
discussing the benefits of green pricing
(Section 3). Section 4 discusses a number of
potential green pricing initiatives: carbon
pricing, pricing local pollutants, congestion
pricing and the elimination of fossil fuel subsi-
dies. Section 5 reviews the main hurdles for
green pricing—both political and institutional.
Section 6 reviews lessons from three important
cases of green pricing reform in the region:
Australia’s carbon price, Singapore’s conges-
tion pricing and Indonesia’s fuel subsidy reduc-
tions. The final section concludes. My focus is
on theAsia Pacific, defined here as all countries
in the World Bank groups of (i) East Asia and
the Pacific; and (ii) South Asia, a bloc repre-
senting 55 per cent of the global population.
The case for more appropriate resource pricing
also holds more broadly. Indeed, underpricing
of fossil fuels is particularly pronounced in a
number of mostly oil-rich countries outside the
region (e.g. Iran). The article concentrates on
atmospheric pollution and road congestion,
although the discussion is relevant for resource
management more broadly.
2. A Trifecta of Challenges
The first challenge in the trifecta is the sizeable
negative externalities associated with under-
priced resource use in many countries in the
Asia Pacific. Environmental degradation is
among the worst side effects of Asia’s rapid
economic growth. Fifty-seven of the cities
ranked as the world’s 100 most polluted in
terms of atmospheric particulate matter of
10 μm or less in diameter (PM10) are in the
Asia Pacific (World Health Organization
2011).1 The health and economic costs of this
pollution are substantial: outdoor air pollution
is a leading cause of sickness and mortality,
resulting in an estimated 1.8 million deaths
each year in China and India alone (Wong 2013;
Yee 2013). The Asia Pacific is now also the
source of 40 per cent of annual anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions, a share that is set to
continue to increase over the coming years
(World Resources Institute 2013).
A similar ‘tragedy of the commons’-type
problem is the crushing road congestion
that clogs many Asian cities, particularly
megacities such as Jakarta, Manila and Delhi.
Some residents spend as much as four hours
each day commuting to and from their work-
places (Cochrane 2013). The costs of conges-
tion in terms of inefficient time use and
increased fuel use and pollution are sizeable.
The root cause of excessive road congestion is
the same as the root cause of excessive pollu-
tion: underpricing.
The second challenge, and one rightly
afforded high priority by many governments in
the region, is the need to improve living stan-
dards and alleviate poverty. Despite rapid prog-
ress, the Asia Pacific is still home to the
majority of the world’s poor. In 2010, the region
accounted for around 750 million of the world’s
1.2 billion people living on less than US$1.25 a
day in purchasing power parity terms (World
Bank 2013a). Most of the region’s poor live in
the two giants of India (400 million) and China
(156 million), although poverty rates are higher
in low-income countries such as Bangladesh
and Myanmar.
The third challenge is the tight fiscal con-
straints faced by many countries. Total tax
revenue collected by all levels of government
equals only 3 per cent of gross domestic
product (GDP) in Myanmar, 7 per cent in India,
8 per cent in Taiwan, 9 per cent in Afghanistan
and Bangladesh, 10 per cent in Pakistan, 11
per cent in Cambodia, and 12 per cent in Indo-
nesia and the Philippines (Heritage Foundation
2013). The reasons for small tax collections
include low tax rates and rampant non-
compliance due to the large size of informal or
‘hard-to-tax’ sectors and the weakness of tax
agencies (Keen 2012). Limited fiscal bases
restrict abilities to provide the public invest-
ments in health, education and infrastructure
1. Energy-intensive Iran accounts for 16 of the other cities
among the top 100.
Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies September 2014562
© 2014 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
that have normally been required for sustained
poverty reduction. China collects 18 per cent of
GDPin taxes, still less than developed countries
(Australia: 21 per cent; United States: 25
per cent; Japan: 29 per cent; and United
Kingdom: 35 per cent).
Constraints on public finances are com-
pounded by the large fossil fuel subsidies that
exist in some countries. Figure 1 shows Inter-
national Energy Agency (IEA) estimates of
year-2011 fossil fuel consumption subsidies
for 13 Asia-Pacific countries with a combined
population of 3.5 billion (91 per cent of the
region’s population). These exceed 5 per cent
of GDP in Pakistan and Bangladesh, and non-
negligible shares in all of the listed countries
except the Republic of Korea. In dollar terms,
fossil fuel consumption subsidies are largest in
India (US$43 billion in 2012), China ($27
billion) and Indonesia ($26 billion) (IEA
2013b). Data on retail pump prices reveal that
the region’s most heavily subsidised gasoline
is in Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia and Malay-
sia (World Bank 2013b). In Indonesia, a
quarter of central government spending goes to
subsidising fuel and electricity. In Pakistan and
Bangladesh, fossil fuel consumption subsidies
substantially exceed public expenditure on
health and education (Figure 2).
3. Potential Benefits of Green Pricing
The merits of environmental pricing are
increasingly recognised, with the United
Nations (2011), World Bank (2012), Asian
Development Bank (2013), International
Monetary Fund (2013a), and Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD 2013) forming a growing chorus of
support. The Global Green Growth Institute,
based in Seoul, was established in 2010. The
leaders of several Asia-Pacific countries have
also adopted the language of green growth,
even if policy progress has not always been
impressive. This section discusses the ability
of externality pricing to address the trifecta of
challenges.
3.1 Reducing Externalities, Cheaply
The most obvious benefit of pricing negative
externalities is a reduction in those externali-
ties. Gasoline taxes provide a useful illustra-
tion. While the rationale for taxing gasoline
may often be simply to raise revenue, gasoline
taxes nevertheless have important effects on
road sector externalities. Figure 3 presents new
estimates of the average effects of a 10 per cent
increase in gasoline prices. The estimates are
Figure 1 Fossil Fuel Consumption Subsidies as a Share of GDP: Selected Asia-Pacific Countries, 2011
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long-run elasticities using international panel
data, and suggest that a 10 per cent increase in
gasoline prices on average leads to a 6 per cent
reduction in gasoline use and related carbon
dioxide emissions, and a 4 per cent reduction
in road deaths. These reductions in gasoline
use and emissions are in part a result of an
average improvement in new-vehicle fuel
economy of 2 per cent. While gasoline demand
is price inelastic, increases in gasoline taxes
(and reductions in gasoline subsidies) can thus
still make an important contribution to con-
serving gasoline, cutting emissions and reduc-
ing road death rates.
Figure 2 Fossil Fuel Consumption Subsidies Relative to Public Expenditure on Health and Education: Selected
Asia-Pacific Countries, 2011
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Notes: International Energy Agency (2013a). Data on health and education expenditure are from the World Bank
(2013b) and cover expenditure by both central and local governments. The y-axis is a ratio; 1 means that fossil fuel
consumption subsidies are equal to public expenditure on health and education.
Figure 3 Estimated Long-Run Impacts of a 10% Increase in Gasoline Prices
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Notes: Estimates use the between estimator for available road sector data for 1991–2010 à la Burke and Nishitateno
(2013, 2014). Carbon dioxide emissions are those from, and assumed to be proportional to, road sector gasoline use.
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Externality pricing can not only reduce
externalities, but also reduce them in a low-
cost manner. The reason for this is that firms
and individuals are expected to respond to an
externality price by reducing the least-valuable
units of that externality (those units for which
abatement is cheaper than paying the charge).
Alternative approaches, such as regulations
and subsidy schemes, are unlikely to be least
costly because it is difficult for governments to
(i) identify what the least-cost abatement
opportunities are; and (ii) design a system of
regulations or subsidies able to capitalise on
these opportunities. Externality pricing
ensures economies pick the ‘lowest hanging
fruit’ in reducing negative externalities. Pollu-
tion and congestion are economic phenomena,
and economic instruments provide an attrac-
tive solution.
A related point is that externality pricing
makes it possible to phase out competing poli-
cies, which themselves typically involve higher
economic costs. Once congestion pricing is in
place, for example, other (less-efficient) poli-
cies aimed at reducing congestion, such as bans
on the use of vehicles on certain days based on
the digits of their number plate, can be elimi-
nated. Such schemes miss many of the least
costly congestion reduction opportunities and
prevent some high-value uses of vehicles. The
introduction of a cap-and-trade scheme for
carbon dioxide emissions serves as a second
illustration. If a cap has been set, there is little
need to retain existing policies aimed at reduc-
ing (within-cap) emissions. Retaining these
policies would lead to higher abatement costs
but the same emissions outcome (as set by the
cap). Exceptions are policies for emissions that
are not covered by the cap (in the agricultural
sector, perhaps) or emissions that might be
relatively immune to price effects due to
principal-agent or other problems.
3.2 Reducing Poverty
There is growing evidence that moving from
subsidising to taxing fossil fuels helps reduce
income disparities in developing countries, as
a disproportionate share of fossil fuels is
consumed by the well-off (Sterner 2012).
Modelling for India, for example, shows that
both gasoline and carbon taxes are (or would
be) progressive (Datta 2010). More broadly,
only around 7 per cent of fuel subsidies in low-
and middle-income countries reach the poorest
20 per cent of people, while 43 per cent flow to
the richest fifth (Arze del Granado et al. 2012).
The true poor do not drive gas guzzlers; the
relatively rich are the largest users of private
road vehicles in developing countries, particu-
larly four-wheeled vehicles (Kutzbach 2009).
Congestion pricing in developing countries
would also be likely to raise revenue mostly
from the relatively well-off.
The effect of green pricing on poverty (as
distinct from inequality) depends largely on
how revenues are used. If an adequate share of
revenues is directed towards infrastructure and
services that are used by the poor, cash trans-
fers to the poor, or reductions in existing taxes
that in final incidence affect the poor, a move
to green pricing may be pro-poor (particularly
because revenues from green pricing are pri-
marily raised from the non-poor). While
economic growth will remain the primary
alleviator of poverty (Dollar et al. 2013), green
pricing reforms thus have the potential to play
a supporting role in progress towards this
objective.
There is a possibility that green pricing
schemes that facilitate reductions in existing
taxes may help countries increase their eco-
nomic growth rates. This is known as a double
dividend (strong form), and could have benefi-
cial effects in terms of poverty reduction. Evi-
dence on the strong form of the double
dividend is mixed, and it is known that envi-
ronmental taxes can reduce the incentive to use
inputs by increasing the effective tax on their
use (e.g. Bovenberg & de Mooij 1994). Nev-
ertheless, there is no reason to think that
green taxes are generally more malevolent
for the economy than the worst existing taxes,
some of which are highly inefficient and
distortionary.2 From an efficiency viewpoint,
2. The Henry Review (Henry et al. 2009, Chart 1.5) iden-
tified that taxes on insurance, payrolls and corporate
income are among Australia’s most distorting taxes in
terms of the marginal welfare lost per dollar of revenue
collected. Fuel tax was identified as having a lower
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green pricing is best considered as part of tax
reform packages aimed at eliminating taxes
that have the largest deadweight losses. Lower
levels of congestion and pollution may also
themselves directly facilitate faster economic
growth and/or benefit the poor.
3.3 Fiscal Benefits
The revenue collected from green prices can
make a contribution to strengthening govern-
ments’ fiscal positions and broadening their
revenue bases. Governments need to raise
revenue in some form, and while environmen-
tal prices are never likely to provide a domi-
nant share of government collections, they can
be handy. Revenues from Australia’s carbon
price equalled 2 per cent of central govern-
ment cash receipts in its second year of opera-
tion, for instance (Australian Government
2014). Environmentally related taxes, mostly
on motor vehicle fuels, typically contribute
around 6 per cent of total government tax
revenue in OECD countries (OECD 2010).
Alternative approaches to reducing pollution,
such as abatement subsidies or regulations,
impose net financial burdens on governments
in the form of cash payments and monitoring
and enforcement costs.
Many developing countries have had a his-
toric reliance on revenue from import taxes,
principally because these tend to be cheaper to
administer than broader-based taxes, such as
income tax (Besley & Persson 2013). Some
externality taxes are similarly advantageous in
terms of their low administration costs. A
carbon price, for example, can be levied
upstream and collected at fossil fuel extraction
and importation sites (Jotzo 2013). A tax that
needs to be acquitted by a relatively small
number of taxpayers in this way is an attractive
option for tax agencies in developing countries.
There are important fiscal benefits from
removing fossil fuel subsidies. Doing so frees
up resources for other spending, to reduce
taxes, or to improve the fiscal balance. Fossil
fuel subsidy reform also reduces the exposure
of government budgets to increases in fossil
fuel prices and fossil fuel use.
4. Potential Green Pricing Reforms in the
Asia Pacific
4.1 Carbon Pricing
The largest emitters in the Asia Pacific have
committed to greenhouse gas emission reduc-
tions under the Copenhagen Accord. China has
a target to lower emissions per unit of GDP by
40–45 per cent by 2020 compared with 2005;
India’s target is for a reduction in its emissions
intensity of GDP of 20–25 per cent over the
same period. Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of
Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Australia
and New Zealand are among others to have
taken on emissions targets, although in loosen-
ing its target in November 2013 Japan demon-
strated that these are not set in stone.3
It is widely recognised that greenhouse gas
(‘carbon’) pricing offers the least-cost
approach to achieving any emissions reduction
target. The cost advantages of emissions
pricing can be substantial: the OECD (2013)
examined country experiences and found that
the cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions
using subsidies or feed-in tariffs can be an
order of magnitude larger than using price-
based approaches.
Of the variety of ways in which carbon
pricing can be implemented, emissions trading
schemes—set a cap and then allow trading of
emissions permits at a market-determined
price—have been the most popular. China is
currently establishing emissions trading pilot
schemes, and a proposal for the introduction of
a nationwide carbon tax is also being consid-
ered. Australia, New Zealand and the Japanese
regions of Tokyo and Saitama have mandatory
emissions trading schemes (see below for a
discussion of Australia’s scheme). In Novem-
per-unit welfare loss. There is scope for additional mod-
elling of the general equilibrium effects of environmental
taxes vis-à-vis other taxes, especially for low-income
countries.
3. Japan’s initial Copenhagen target was a 25 per cent
reduction in emissions from 1990 levels by 2020. In
November 2013, Japan moved to the much easier target of
a 3.8 per cent reduction in emissions from 2005 levels by
2020, which equals a 3.1 per cent increase in emissions
from 1990 levels by 2020 (Climate Action Tracker 2013).
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ber 2012, the Republic of Korea approved a
mandatory emissions trading scheme to com-
mence in 2015. Thailand (proposed voluntary
scheme by 2014) and Vietnam (proposed man-
datory scheme by 2020) have plans to follow
suit, although delays should not be unexpected.
The world is only at the beginning of what
will be a long road of climate change mitiga-
tion efforts. In this context, there is a high
likelihood that there will be continued spread
in the use of carbon pricing. The simplest
approach to carbon pricing in any individual
country is a carbon tax that increases along a
smooth trajectory over time. This approach
would provide the required signal to investors
that low-carbon technologies will be increas-
ingly profitable in the future, gently steering
economies in a lower carbon direction. The tax
could be introduced as part of broader reforms,
including the cutting of other taxes. There are
benefits from the harmonisation of carbon tax
rates across countries, although variation in
other policies and taxes affecting the implicit
price of carbon (OECD 2013) makes this a
secondary issue.
Advantages of carbon taxes include that the
transaction costs and price uncertainty of
emissions trading can be avoided. Carbon
taxes are also administratively simpler than
emissions trading, which is attractive particu-
larly for developing countries. On the other
hand, emissions trading schemes provide more
certainty over emissions quantities and have a
title that does not include the politically
unpopular word ‘tax’. Over the long run, emis-
sions trading schemes with tightening caps are
capable of producing similar outcomes to a
rising carbon tax.
4.2 Pricing Local Pollutants
Various pricing schemes for local pollutants
have been used in the Asia Pacific. Japan intro-
duced emission fees for atmospheric sulphur
oxide emissions in 1974, with revenues used to
compensate victims of air pollution. The tax
reached a relatively high rate in the late 1980s
before falling, and helped bring about a large
fall in emissions (OECD 2010). Other
examples include Malaysia’s charges for plan-
tation effluent (since 1978) and the small pol-
lution fees that have been applied in China
since the 1980s (Stavins 2003). In 2010, India
introduced a small tax on coal. Small taxes
on coal, oil products, certain chemicals,
hydrochlorofluorocarbons and plastic bags
came into effect in Vietnam in 2012, although
implementation remains patchy. Some Asian
countries have high taxes on certain emissions-
intensive products (the motivation for which
does not relate solely to pollution). Large
gasoline taxes in Hong Kong, Japan and the
Republic of Korea, for example, have resulted
in these countries having some of the world’s
highest gasoline prices (World Bank 2013b).
Emissions trading schemes for local envi-
ronmental problems in the Asia Pacific are
rare. The world’s first salinity trading scheme,
the Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme in
Australia, was introduced in 2002 and has
been a success. Korea has operated a cap-and-
trade scheme for emissions of nitrous oxide
and sulphur oxide since 2007. A pilot of an
emissions trading scheme for particulates has
been announced for the Indian city of Surat
(Bhatt 2013). Australia and New Zealand have
been among the international pioneers of ‘indi-
vidual transferable quotas’ for fisheries, which
are essentially cap-and-trade schemes for fish
catches. Other countries in the region have yet
to adopt this approach, despite its economic,
environmental and sustainability benefits.
While market-based instruments are becom-
ing more common, the region’s principal
approach to addressing pollution remains
‘command-and-control’. China uses mandates
for the installation of desulphurisation equip-
ment and the closure of inefficient power
plants, for instance. India’s environmental
management relies heavily on environmental
standards for vehicles and industrial activities
(Sawhney 2004). In short, the potential exists
for almost all countries in the region to better
harness the benefits of price-based approaches
to addressing local pollution problems.
4.3 Congestion Pricing
Access to most roads in the Asia Pacific is free.
As a result, the individual decisions of road
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users lead to highly suboptimal road use.
Imposing charges to reflect the congestion
costs of using key roads at popular times is the
most efficient means of reducing congestion.
Results from the field of behavioural econom-
ics reveal that congestion pricing is likely to be
particularly effective because it overcomes the
power of ‘free’: moving from a zero price to a
positive price typically results in a large reduc-
tion in quantity demanded (Lew & Leong
2009). If funds are used for road maintenance,
congestion pricing is also advantageous from a
user-pays’ perspective. Congestion pricing is
much better for fiscal balances than the
common alternative to dealing with road con-
gestion: build more roads, and then perhaps
prohibit certain uses of these roads via transit
lanes, number plate restrictions and other
restrictions.
Singapore has the most sophisticated system
of road pricing in the world (see below), an
approach that has helped the country avoid the
serious road congestion problems faced by
some of its neighbours. Hong Kong piloted
electronic road pricing in the 1980s, but did
not proceed with the scheme after a variety of
concerns—ranging from privacy to how
revenue would be used—were raised by the
public (Whittles 2003). Other cities in the
region, including Beijing and Jakarta, are cur-
rently considering congestion pricing.
4.4 Eliminating Fossil Fuel Subsidies
Fossil fuel subsidies are, in effect, a negative
or reverse environmental tax. In 2009,
members of both the G20 and the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation group committed to
phase out fossil fuel subsidies over the
medium term. The environmental benefits of
the complete elimination of fossil fuel subsi-
dies would be substantial: modelling suggests
that phasing out global fossil fuel consumption
subsidies would on its own contribute to a 6
per cent reduction in annual greenhouse gas
emissions by 2050 (IEA et al. 2011).
Once a subsidy is in place, its dismantling is
politically challenging because those who
benefit from the status quo can provide vocal
opposition. Some progress is being made, with
Indonesia, India, China, Malaysia and Thai-
land all increasing subsidised energy prices
during 2013 (IEA 2013b). As the case of Indo-
nesia shows (see below), the smoothest reduc-
tions in fossil fuel subsidies have typically
involved clear communication of the rationale
for reform and a popular alternative use of
public funds (Sterner 2012, Vagliasindi 2012,
International Monetary Fund 2013a). In Indo-
nesia, this alternative use of funds has included
measures to help the poor adjust to price
increases.
5. Hurdles for Green Pricing
The largest hurdles to environmental tax
reform are political. Tax increases can be hard
to sell, and an attractive target for attacks by
political opponents. There is little doubt that
energy price increases can be unpopular
with the public: many countries—including
China—have seen street protests in response.
In countries such as Indonesia, memories of
the role of commodity price increases in trig-
gering political downfalls remain fresh (Burke
2012).
The political challenge exists because there
are likely to be both winners and losers from
any environmental pricing reform, and the
losers have an interest in campaigning against
change. In some instances, entrenched inter-
ests are capable of spending substantial sums
doing so. Australia’s coal industry, for
instance, was able to launch a well-funded
advertising campaign against the introduction
of a price on carbon (Lane 2011). The benefi-
ciaries of pollution reductions are often less
concentrated and less able to organise to apply
political pressure. People also exhibit ‘loss
aversion’ (Kahneman 2011)—a tendency to be
more aggrieved about losses (e.g. paying a new
environmental tax) than gains (e.g. reductions
in other taxes). Green pricing schemes can also
be complicated and difficult to explain, and
coordinating tax reform when tax instruments
and revenues are shared across multiple levels
of government is a daunting political and insti-
tutional challenge.
As a result of the above factors, tax systems
often exhibit a high degree of stasis: old taxes
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are seen as good taxes, and tax reform as risky.
Alternative approaches to reducing externali-
ties, such as regulations, can be attractive
politically, even if they involve higher eco-
nomic cost. History shows that environmental
pricing is possible, however. An important
feature of successful schemes is effort to
smooth the transition by providing alternative
benefits, whether by tax reductions (personal
or corporate) or targeted government spending
initiatives. Environmental pricing schemes can
also be made more politically feasible by using
tax thresholds or free permits to exempt
inframarginal units (Pezzey & Jotzo 2013).
These serve to reduce the total revenue take of
any scheme without affecting marginal incen-
tives to abate, although do forfeit much of the
potential for a double dividend. Providing
clear information on the motivation for and
benefits of green pricing is also vital to achiev-
ing political acceptance (OECD 2006). Once
established, environmental pricing schemes
can benefit from the same status quo inertia
that made their introduction so challenging in
the first place, and so may fade away as issues
of political debate (King et al. 2007).
While the technologies for pricing externali-
ties (or close proxies of externalities) exist and
are improving, institutional challenges to
introducing green pricing can also be daunting.
Institutional awareness of the benefits of green
pricing may be low, and the weak tax, transfer
and environmental monitoring systems in
developing countries make some schemes
infeasible to establish and/or enforce
(Blackman & Harrington 2000). In China, for
example, many enterprises underreport their
emissions, undermining the usefulness of
emissions levy schemes (Cao 2010). In coun-
tries with particularly weak institutions, such
as Myanmar and Pakistan, complex forms of
environmental pricing—such as schemes that
require monitoring the emissions of a large
number of firms—are likely to be impractical.
Institutional weaknesses strengthen the case
for the use of upstream pricing initiatives, as
these involve fewer taxpayers and monitoring
requirements.
Improvements in government adminis-
trative capacities, together with continued
technological advances, are likely to reduce
scheme implementation difficulties over time.
Improvements in road tolling technologies, for
example, have vastly reduced the costs of
administering congestion prices. Despite this,
it is certainly more challenging to introduce
congestion pricing in low-income cities
where registration of vehicles may be incom-
plete, exclusion from roads challenging,
enforcement of rules inadequate, and installing
and maintaining tolling devices still a rela-
tively expensive exercise.4 Singapore, on the
other hand, provided the ideal environment for
road pricing (see case study below).
An additional challenge is that existing
energy price regulation can blunt the full
impact of green pricing reforms. Carbon
pricing works best if price flow-through affects
decisions on as many margins as possible. Yet
in China, for example, coal price increases are
not fully passed through to higher electricity
prices due to rigidities in electricity pricing
(Howes & Dobes 2010). In Indonesia, electric-
ity price increases require the approval of
Parliament. There are, however, various alter-
natives for facilitating price pass-through even
without full energy price deregulation. Subse-
quent to the adoption of a carbon price, gov-
ernments could approve increases in final
electricity prices equal to estimates of the
appropriate carbon price pass-through, for
instance.
Ideally, environmental prices would be
levied on the external damage caused by
emissions and congestion rather than on more
distantly related dimensions, such as vehicle
registration, size and emission ratings
(Parry et al. 2012). Levies on these other
dimensions—while common—do not lead to
an equalisation of marginal abatement costs
across different abatement opportunities, and
so do not offer least-cost reductions of an
externality. Sizeable efficiency improvements
and reductions in negative externalities could
4. An example of an ‘upstream pricing initiative’ in the
case of congestion pricing is to instead rely on the taxation
of gasoline and diesel. While fuel use is not perfectly
correlated with congestion, reduced use of gasoline and
diesel will flow through to some reduction in congestion.
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be achieved by moving towards fees more
closely related to externality damage itself.
6. Lessons from Regional Experiences
Recent experiences in green pricing provide
lessons for future reform efforts. This section
explores three case studies.
6.1 Australia’s Carbon Price
In 2011, Australia’s Parliament passed legisla-
tion for a national emissions trading scheme
for greenhouse gases, exempting road trans-
port and agriculture. The scheme became
operational on 1 July 2012, with an initial plan
for three years of fixed prices before moving to
a floating price. The fixed price has meant that
the scheme has commonly been referred to as
a carbon ‘tax’. The price was $23/tonne carbon
dioxide in fiscal year 2012–2013, increasing to
$24 in 2013–2014. The reform package
included a reduction in income taxes and an
increase in welfare transfers, leaving most
households better off in net terms (Phillips &
Taylor 2012).
On its merits alone, it is hard not to conclude
that the scheme has to date been a success.
Inflation has remained within the Reserve
Bank of Australia’s target range, and a 6
per cent reduction in electricity sector carbon
dioxide emissions was witnessed in the first
year of operation (not solely due to carbon
pricing; Saddler 2013). The scheme was born
with fatal political flaws, however: a lack of
bipartisan support, and a perceived broken
commitment by then Prime Minister Julia
Gillard to not introduce a carbon ‘tax’. The
then-opposition ran a relentless campaign
focused on the allegedly high impact of the
carbon price on Australians’ ‘cost of living’
and pledged to repeal the scheme if elected.
They proposed an alternative approach to
emissions reductions involving subsidies for
discrete emission reduction projects (known as
‘direct action’), despite advice from econo-
mists that this approach would involve higher
economic costs. Australia’s change of govern-
ment in September 2013 means that the coun-
try’s brief experiment with carbon pricing
looks set to be coming to an end.
The main lesson from the Australian expe-
rience is that the politics of environmental
pricing can be delicate, although the same
holds for reforms in other contentious policy
areas also.5 Policies for which there is a strong
political consensus and that are well commu-
nicated to the public stand a much better
chance of success. A particular lesson is the
need for careful choice of language in commu-
nicating reform. The government’s acceptance
of the term ‘carbon tax’ proved unwise given
the prime minister’s earlier commitment. In
future contexts, terms such as ‘carbon permit
charge’ or ‘carbon emission fee’ might meet
more welcoming ears. The government also
commonly referred to the revenue recycling
component of the reform as ‘compensation’, a
term that evokes injury; more focus on ‘tax
cuts’ would have better directed attention to
gains rather than pains. The case also high-
lights that divergences between pre-election
announcements and post-election policy deci-
sions can greatly undermine the political
sustainability of any reform.
6.2 Singapore’s Congestion Pricing
Singapore’s Area License Scheme (ALS),
introduced in 1975, was the world’s first con-
gestion pricing program. The scheme required
drivers entering a 6-km2 area in the central
business district during peak hours to purchase
and display a paper certificate. Upon imple-
mentation, traffic into Singapore’s restricted
zone during morning peak hours fell by around
45 per cent, average speeds increased and
many people switched to public transport
(Phang & Toh 1997). The ALS was replaced
by an electronic version called Electronic
Road Pricing (ERP) in 1998, with charges
varying by time, location and vehicle type.
In 1990, Singapore adopted a Vehicle Quota
System (VQS) to supplement congestion
pricing. Monthly auctions are held under the
VQS for Certificates of Entitlement to own and
5. The goods and services tax, minerals rent taxation,
education, and health are examples of other reform areas
that have received intense political debate in Australia.
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operate a vehicle for a period of 10 years. The
justification for the VQS was in part that with
the congestion pricing technologies in use at
the time, a vehicle quota was administratively
cheaper than extending congestion pricing
throughout the island (Christainsen 2006). The
city state also administers parking fees and a
number of additional vehicle fees and taxes.
A measure of the success of Singapore’s
congestion pricing is that peak-hour traffic
volume to the central business district remains
below what it was in 1975, despite large
increases in population, economic activity and
vehicle numbers (Land Transport Authority
2012). Average speeds during peak hours
equal 63 km per hour on freeways and 29 km
per hour in the central business district and on
arterial roads (Land Transport Authority
2013), much faster than Jakarta’s reported
13 km per hour (Oxford Business Group
2012). The benefits of efficiently flowing
transport have likely contributed to Singa-
pore’s stellar economic performance, with the
country now having a GDP per capita among
the highest in the world (in purchasing power
parity terms; World Bank 2013b).
There are several ingredients to the success
of road pricing in Singapore. Singapore has
strong institutions, a geography conducive to
congestion pricing, and a public transport
system that has received sizeable public invest-
ment and offers an attractive alternative to
private vehicles. The government has also used
marketing and information campaigns to com-
municate the scheme, which analysts consider
important for public understanding and accep-
tance (Vonk Noordegraaf et al. 2014). The lack
of strong political opposition in Singapore also
undoubtedly makes it easier to implement
reform. Singapore’s early adoption of conges-
tion pricing was also important, as the system
was in place before congestion got out of hand.
Adopting congestion pricing once a population
has grown accustomed to private vehicle travel
and inefficient time usage is surely more
difficult.
A contributor to the effectiveness of Singa-
pore’s congestion pricing is its visibility.
When drivers pass under an ERP gantry at a
time of day when a congestion charge applies,
the charge is immediately deducted from their
smart card and the dollar value of the charge is
flashed up on an in-vehicle electronic device. It
is believed that drivers are more sensitive to
prices when they are regularly reminded of
what they are paying (Christainsen 2006). The
lesson is that to be effective in inducing
behavioural change, green prices are supposed
to hurt. The alternative is living with an excess
of negative externalities: in this case traffic
jams.
Another lesson from Singapore’s experience
with congestion pricing is the importance of
reviewing and improving externality pricing
schemes over time. Singapore has continued to
expand its scheme, including with new ERP
gantries installed on semi-major roads that had
started to clog. Congestion prices are reviewed
quarterly, and changes to the system are imple-
mented to adapt to circumstances. For example,
since 2003, the ERP has implemented more
gradual phase-ins of high-fee time slots to
reduce the incentive for vehicles to speed up to
beat the clock. Singapore is considering adopt-
ing distance-based electronic congestion
pricing rather than the current system of point-
specific tolls, a move that may allow congestion
pricing to be further expanded.
6.3 Indonesia’s 2013 Fuel Subsidy
Reductions
Fuel subsidies have been a feature of Indone-
sia’s fiscal landscape since the country’s inde-
pendence, and have ballooned in size over
recent years as both fuel demand and the inter-
national price of oil have risen. The most recent
of several reforms to Indonesia’s fuel subsidies
was in June 2013, when subsidised prices of
gasoline and diesel were increased by 44
per cent and 22 per cent, respectively. The price
increases were coupled with unconditional
cash transfers to 15.5 million poor households
over a period of four months, community infra-
structure initiatives, conditional cash transfers,
scholarships for the poor and temporary
increases in allocations of subsidised rice.
Similar approaches were used in recent rounds
of subsidy reform in 2005 and 2008. Indone-
sia’s provision of targeted benefits to the poor
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has been generally successful, although there
are some implementation issues, such as the
leaking of benefits to people outside the tar-
geted population (Nehru 2013).
While some street protests are witnessed
whenever fuel prices are increased in Indone-
sia, recent episodes have seen much less oppo-
sition than earlier attempts. The coupling of
benefits for the poor to fuel price reform pack-
ages has played an important role in this
change, as has improved communication of the
need for reform. As the poor are not large
beneficiaries from fuel subsidies, transfers to
the poor are perhaps more important in nulli-
fying political arguments against reform than
in actually addressing equity implications.
There is a long way to go in reducing Indo-
nesia’s fuel subsidies. Prices for subsidised
gasoline and diesel remain fixed, which means
that increasing demand for fuel will see spend-
ing on fuel subsidies continue to rise without
further action (assuming world oil prices do
not fall substantially). The best way to address
this particular aspect of the problem would be
to move to a per-litre subsidy rather than main-
taining a guaranteed subsidised price, even if it
takes time for the per-litre subsidy to be com-
pletely eliminated.
A 2012 Jakarta-based survey (Burke &
Resosudarmo 2012) found that further reduc-
tions in fuel subsidies, coupled with spending
on alternative priorities, might be popular.
Nevertheless, the common assessment in Indo-
nesia is that fuel price reform remains politi-
cally risky, and is unlikely in the election year
of 2014. This is unfortunate, as the costs of the
current arrangements are large. Nevertheless,
Indonesia’s recent experience of subsidy
reductions, and in particular the use of cash
transfers and other initiatives to win broad
support, serves as a useful example for envi-
ronmental pricing reforms elsewhere.
7. Conclusion
There is substantial scope for increasing the
use of environmental pricing in the Asia
Pacific. If well designed, green pricing can
reduce a variety of ‘tragedy of the commons’-
type problems, be pro-poor and improve the
fiscal capacities of cash-strapped govern-
ments. China’s 12th Five-Year Plan requires
the reform of environmental taxation, and
there is growing momentum for the introduc-
tion of a variety of green pricing schemes else-
where. Not all countries are moving in the
same direction, however, as Australia’s likely
repeal of its carbon price demonstrates.
Green pricing is just one of the many poten-
tial reforms to improve the efficiency and
equity of tax systems in the Asia Pacific.
Expansion of the coverage of consumption and
income taxes are also priorities in many econo-
mies. Environmental prices will never provide
a particularly large share of government rev-
enues, and if they did there is a danger that
governments would have a perverse incentive
to become reliant on pollution. Asia-Pacific
countries are far from such a situation,
however. It is also important to note that the
revenues from instruments such as a rising
carbon price should be expected to eventually
decrease as emissions fall.
Green pricing offers the opportunity for
countries at an early stage of the development
process, such as Myanmar, to follow greener
development trajectories than those followed
by China, India and the rest of the region. As
shown by Singapore’s experience with conges-
tion pricing, early introduction of pricing
schemes can prevent externality problems from
getting out of hand in the first place. Political
challenges are sizeable, but sweeteners in the
form of cuts to other taxes or targeted govern-
ment expenditures, coupled with clear commu-
nication of the benefits of green pricing, can
help overcome these. Institutional constraints
also often loom large and point towards
upstream pricing initiatives that minimise
administrative burdens. If designed and imple-
mented effectively, charges on emissions and
congestion need not mean slower economic
growth, but would help avoid the severe pollu-
tion and congestion problems that have marred
so many Asian development experiences.
June 2014.
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